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Abstract 
 
If one is to believe recent popular scientific accounts of developments in 
physics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, most of the 
perennial philosophical questions have been wrested from the hands of 
philosophers by now, only to be resolved (or sometimes dissolved) by 
contemporary science. To mention but a few examples of issues that 
science has now allegedly dealt with: the origin and destiny of the 
universe, the origin of human life, the soul, free will, morality, and 
religion. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that these claims 
stem from the pervasive influence of a scientistic epistemology in popular 
science writing, (2) to argue that this influence is undesirable because it 
ultimately undermines not only the important role of popular science 
reporting in society but also the public’s trust in science, and (3) to offer 
suggestions on how popular science writing can be improved. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
By increasing scientific literacy, popular science writing fulfills an important function in 
society. Science is a highly specialized and complex endeavor and its inner workings are 
virtually inaccessible to lay audiences. Nonetheless, scientific findings play a major role 
in society, by driving technological innovation, informing political decision-making and 
policy-building, and sometimes even by affecting people’s self-image and worldview. 
And rightly so, because science is an impressive and highly successful effort to 
understand ourselves and the world we live in better. Popular science writing is one way 
in which the general public can stay informed about current scientific developments and 
thus form well-grounded opinions about broader developments in society that occur as a 
result of scientific developments. 
 
It would very troubling, then, if best-selling popular science books were to be misleading, 
inaccurate, or otherwise flawed. Yet, this is indeed what is the case, or so I will argue in 
this paper. A lot of popular science writing is infested by what I take to be a 
fundamentally flawed epistemology, namely scientism, which — roughly — is the view 
that science is the only genuine source of knowledge about ourselves and the universe we 
live in. Moreover, scientism is typically assumed implicitly. One doesn’t find any explicit 
articulation of it, let alone attempts to defend its truth or the reasonableness of assuming 
it. Hence, scientistic assumptions are easily overlooked, especially by lay audiences, most 
whom will not be sensitized to such matters as a result of, say, formal training in 
epistemology or philosophy of science. 
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I want to start by giving a quick impression of what this leads to. If you were to judge by 
the contents of recent popular scientific accounts of developments in physics, 
evolutionary biology, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and evolutionary psychology, 
you would get the impression that many of the perennial big questions have now rightly 
been taken away from philosophers and other non-scientists. The advancement of science 
has finally given us definitive and empirically well-founded answers to them or, 
alternatively, it has shown that they can be dismissed as confused, misguided, or 
pointless. 
 
Francis Crick, for instance, writes: “No longer need one spend time attempting… to 
endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. 
Consciousness is now largely a scientific problem” (Crick 1996: 486). Frans de Waal  
concurs: “We seem to be reaching a point at which science can wrest morality from the 
hands of philosophers” (De Waal 1996: 218). Alex Rosenberg takes it to the max when 
he asserts that, in so far as the big questions are concerned: “Science has found the 
answers — some of them 400 years ago, others in the nineteenth century, and several 
others quite recently” (Rosenberg 2012: ix). Sam Harris sympathizes with this vision, 
although he is slightly more careful about the extent to which it has been realized already: 
“It seems inevitable, however, that science will gradually encompass life’s deepest 
questions” (2010: 7). Such claims are widespread. In an appendix, I’ve collected several 
more. 
 
My goal in this paper is threefold: (1) to show the influence of scientism on popular 
science writing (sections 3, 4, and 5) and (2) to argue that this influence is undesirable 
(section 6) and (3) to suggest ways in which popular science writing can be improved 
(section 7). Before we get to this, however, I will use the next section to say more about 
what scientism is and why it can seem so appealing. 
 
2. Scientism 
 
To make my charge that popular science writers have fallen prey to a scientistic 
epistemology more precise, we need to get clear on what scientism is. Like naturalism 
and physicalism, scientism is a term that has been given various meanings in both the 
popular (e.g., Kitcher 2012; Hughes 2012; Pinker 2013) and the philosophical literature 
(e.g., Sorell 1991; Stenmark 2001; Haack 2003; Rosenberg 2011; Ladyman et al. 2007; 
Peels forthcoming). A common thread running through them is of course an emphasis on 
the superiority and importance of (natural) science for human knowledge and 
understanding. 
 
Massimo Pigliucci has recently given a fairly representative definition of scientism. 
Scientism, he writes, is:  
 
A totalizing attitude that regards science as the ultimate standard and 
arbiter of all interesting questions; or alternatively that seeks to expand the 
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very definition and scope of science to encompass all aspects of human 
knowledge and understanding. (Pigliucci 2013: 144) 
 
Although people might object to the term ‘totalizing’ as being too pejorative and quibble 
about whether scientism really aims to ‘expand’ the reach of science — after all, for an 
adherent of scientism all human knowledge presumably has always been within the reach 
of the sciences, even if people didn't recognize this — this definition is a good start. 
 
This definition can be refined by distinguishing between epistemological and ontological 
claims (cf. also Stenmark 2001; Peels forthcoming for this). Epistemological scientism 
holds that science is our only source of knowledge about ourselves and the world, while 
remaining non-committal on whether it is also the final arbiter of what exists. Ontological 
scientism maintains that science has the last word on what exists: Only those things exist 
that science — or perhaps a future, finalized science — recognizes or postulates. The two 
can be combined into a single position, but they can come apart too. One might subscribe 
to ontological scientism and hold that science has the final say on what exists, but that 
there are different viable paths to knowledge of the world, science being only of them 
(albeit perhaps a very important one) — thus rejecting ontological scientism. 
Alternatively, one might accept epistemological scientism and think that science is our 
only source of knowledge about the world, but also reject ontological scientism because 
one believes that science, and thus human knowledge, is limited as it does not have 
access to everything that exists or to all aspects of everything that exists.
1
 
 
For present purposes, epistemological scientism (ES) is most important. So let’s define it 
slightly more formally as follows: 
 
(ES) Science is the only source of justified belief or knowledge about 
ourselves and the world. 
 
I’ll add some further clarifications. First, ES doesn’t entail that we already know 
everything there is to know. It just says that if there is knowledge to be had about an 
issue, science is the only or the best way to acquire it. We should not rely on alleged 
sources of knowledge such as common sense, memory, testimony, pure reason, moral 
intuition, a priori philosophical argument, let alone revelation or a presumed divine sense. 
Second, ES allows for provisional reliance on other presumed sources of knowledge for 
                                            
1 Alexander Rosenberg — one of the few card-carrying proponents of scientism — defines scientism as 
follows:  
 
The conviction that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure 
knowledge of anything; that science’s description of the world is correct in its 
fundamentals; and that when “complete,” what science tells us will not be surprisingly 
different from what it tells us today. (Rosenberg 2011: 6–7) 
 
This definition thus combines epistemological and ontological scientism and adds the further clause that 
scientism takes science’s current picture of the world to be correct in its fundamentals. 
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as long as science hasn’t spoken on certain issues. Belief in philosophical design 
arguments from biological diversity may have been justified before Darwin came along, 
but proper science — the theory of biological evolution, in this case — always trumps 
such arguments. Third, in claiming that science is our only source of knowledge, ES 
doesn’t imply that we don’t form beliefs through other sources. Clearly we do. The point 
is that scientifically supported beliefs always trump beliefs from other sources. Fourth, 
according to ES there are no domains of knowledge exempt from the reach of the 
sciences. Science isn’t just concerned with physical reality and observable human 
behavior, but can — and should — also speak with authority on those matters that used to 
be solely within the purview of the humanities: e.g., the human mind, art, music, 
literature, free will, morality, rationality, and religion. 
 
Why do people believe in epistemological scientism? And why can it seem to be a 
harmless background assumption that is easily overlooked by undiscerning readers? It 
might be the case that some scientists and philosophers who are inclined to scientism do 
have rigorous arguments for it, but they are the exception. Here, I want to focus on two 
quick and dirty arguments that typically aren’t made explicit, but that are ‘in the air’ and 
that I think constitute much of the popular appeal of scientism. 
 
First, there is a halo effect from science. There can be no doubt that science has made 
impressive progress over the course of the years. It has greatly increased our knowledge 
of ourselves and the world around us. Moreover, our whole lives are constantly affected 
— and often made better — by the applications of science: technology, medicine, and 
healthcare. The progress and results of science are so magnificent that it is easy to think 
that, where knowledge is concerned, science can do anything. This is where scientism 
comes in. The idea is that it is motivated by a simple induction from the success of 
science. 
 
Second, when scientism is presented in certain ways, it can look like plain common 
sense. Here is how: If we want to acquire knowledge, we ought collect evidence 
systematically, reflect on our evidence and reason carefully from our evidence to a 
conclusion. Surely, science is our best and most successful way of gathering evidence 
and drawing conclusions from it. The scientific method guarantees that evidence is 
collected carefully and it ensures that the path from the evidence to the conclusion is safe. 
Therefore, if we want to acquire knowledge of anything whatsoever, we ought to do 
science. 
 
These aren’t very good arguments. On closer inspection, scientism suffers from very 
serious problems, as I’ll point out in the next paragraph. But the problem is that 
considerations such as the above can seem fairly persuasive to lay audiences and even 
scientist without much training in philosophy of science or epistemology. As a result, 
neither science writers nor their readers typically pause to consider what scientism really 
implies and whether it is ultimately feasible. 
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In fact, however, there is a lot to be said against scientism. For starters, it’s far from 
obvious how it can deal with mathematical, logical, and conceptual knowledge. An 
adherent of scientism would be hard-pressed to deny knowledge in these domains, but at 
the same time it is clear that knowledge in these areas does not result from empirical 
scientific inquiry. At the very least, then, scientism needs to make room for non-empirical 
(scientific?) inquiry. Furthermore, it’s unclear what scientism can make of introspective 
knowledge (including knowledge of phenomenal consciousness) and knowledge of other 
people’s minds. These, too, aren’t clearly forms of scientific knowledge, yet they are 
undeniably very important and central to our lives. Everyday knowledge and common 
sense also constitute a challenge for scientism. It seems hard to deny that you possess 
knowledge about what you were wearing yesterday, about the way to your friend’s office, 
about that beautiful lake cottage where you vacationed, about how your stomach feels, 
and many more such mundane things. But none of this is based on scientific inquiry. It 
even seems unlikely that scientific inquiry would lead to superior knowledge of these 
topics. Admittedly, it might give you more details or deeper explanations, but that 
wouldn’t make you know better or more securely what you were wearing yesterday. This 
might seem insignificant, until one realizes that all science starts from just such everyday 
knowledge claims: about the readings on a computer screen, observations of behavior, 
survey reports, and so forth. Arguably, then, all science relies on such non-scientific 
knowledge, which would make scientism a nonstarter. Finally, scientism suffers from 
self-referential problems. Not being a scientific claim itself, it would seem scientism 
cannot be known by anyone. This raises the question of why anyone should assert or 
believe it in the first place. This paper, however, is not the place to delve deeper into 
these issues (but see Sorell 1991; Trigg 1993; Stenmark 2001; Haack 2007; Hutchinson 
2011; Pigliucci 2013; Robinson 2015; and De Ridder et al. forthcoming for general 
discussion and development of these and other objections and replies). 
 
3. Dismissing Philosophy 
 
Given the above characterization of scientism, it is easy to see why those who sympathize 
with it would dismiss traditional philosophical discussions of the perennial questions. 
This follows straightforwardly from ES. Given that philosophical work on free will, 
morality, consciousness, etc. relies on conceptual analysis, common sense, a priori 
argument, thought experiments, intuitions, and combinations thereof, adherents of 
scientism will rule that it can give us no knowledge. Once scientific inquiry starts to 
investigate these topics, we should rely on its results as much as we can — provided, of 
course, that the science in question doesn’t suffer from recognized methodological or 
substantive flaws. Even if the data is still limited and uncertain, we ought to start 
theorizing from there rather than continue to rely on inferior sources of information. The 
British geneticist Steve Jones once expressed the overall sentiment in an evocative 
metaphor: “For most wearers of white coats, philosophy is to science as pornography is 
to sex: it is cheaper, easier, and some people seem, bafflingly, to prefer it” (Jones 1997: 
14). 
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Something like the above reasoning is indeed in the background of many popular science 
books, as I’ll now show. One source of dismissiveness towards philosophy is that 
philosophers working on the big questions are ignorant of science and that (therefore) 
their work cannot be taken seriously. According to Stephen Hawking (2010: 5), 
“philosophers have not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly 
physics.” The assumption must be that this is what they ought to have done, if they want 
to continue to talk about the ultimate origin of all that exists. It is thus taken for granted 
that scientific knowledge is our best bet when it comes to finding answers to the big 
questions. 
 
Another frequently cited motivation to rely on science is philosophy’s (alleged) lack of 
progress and (what may amount to the same thing) its failure to reach consensus. This 
was the point of Francis Crick’s jibe about ‘philosophers perpetually disagreeing’.2 The 
contrast obviously is with science, which does make (certain kinds of) progress and does 
reach consensus more or less regularly. Again, the thought is that science is a superior 
source of answers to big questions. 
 
It is also striking that many popular scientific treatments of origins, free will, morality, 
consciousness, and religion hardly engage any philosophical literature on these topics, 
not even to point out its perceived shortcomings or to argue against it. An unfortunate 
effect of this is that some science popularizers come up with woefully inadequate 
characterizations of key concepts and offer very crude arguments for and against 
positions that they’re discussing. Examples of this include the neuroscientist P.R. 
Montague’s description of free will as necessarily presupposing mind-body dualism: 
“Free will is the idea that we make choices and have thoughts independent of anything 
remotely resembling a physical process” Montague (2008: 584). Or Sam Harris’s highly 
idiosyncratic requirement that in order to have free will, “you would need to be aware of 
all the factors that determine your thoughts and action, and you would need to have 
complete control over those factors” (Harris 2012: 13). It is easy to see how such 
misguided characterizations will lead to fallacious arguments against free will. 
 
Given that philosophy has become a specialized discipline in which more is published 
than anyone can reasonably keep track of, it would be unfair to object that science writers 
haven’t digested the latest issues of, say, the Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical 
Review. But that is not my point. Most of the relevant philosophical ideas and arguments 
about issues of origins, free will, morality, or consciousness are readily available from 
accessible introductory philosophy textbooks or free internet resources such as the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy or the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Even 
Wikipedia has fairly decent coverage of the basics in some areas of philosophy. The 
failure even to take notice of these materials suggests that some science popularizers 
                                            
2 A 2008 report on a meeting of biologists discussing the evolution of morality in The Economist explicitly 
makes this point: “Whence morality? That is a question which has troubled philosophers since their subject 
was invented. Two and a half millennia of debate have, however, failed to produce a satisfactory answer. 
So now it is time for someone else to have a go.” 
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simply take it for granted that there is nothing to be learned from philosophical reflection 
on their topics.  
 
4. Scientism in Action: Sam Harris 
 
For all I’ve said so far, one might worry that scientism in popular science writing is a 
frivolous add-on or a commercial strategy, which only impacts forewords and blurbs. 
After all, claiming that one will subvert philosophical wisdom sounds a lot more 
attractive than saying that one will summarize some recent scientific developments which 
pretty much leave everyone’s worldview intact. Scientism, however, runs deeper than this 
as I demonstrate in this and the next section. 
 
I want to start with a look at Sam Harris’s The Moral Landscape. I won’t pretend to offer 
original criticisms of this book here. Various philosophers and other scholars have done 
an excellent job at reviewing the book critically and pointing out its problems.
3
 
Nonetheless, Harris’s book is instructive because it is so explicit and transparent in its 
adoption of a scientistic outlook. 
 
The project of The Moral Landscape is to argue that science can answer questions about 
right and wrong and that it is in fact the best way of finding answers to those questions. A 
first step in Harris’s argument is that the fact/value distinction is a distinction without 
much of a difference. Questions about value translate into questions about facts. Harris 
develops different lines of support for this claim, but a central one involves fMRI studies 
that show that the same brain regions are active when people make factual judgements as 
when they make value judgements. In terms of underlying brain functions, then, “the 
division between facts and values does not make much sense” (121). 
 
Let’s pause briefly to consider this. The fact/value distinction is a logical or conceptual 
distinction between two ‘families’ of concepts. It serves to show that there is no logical 
route from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. Philosophers debate its importance, but no one ever has ever 
suggested that the distinction must be implemented in brain regions and activity in order 
to possess philosophical oomph. So, for Harris to draw on fMRI results to discredit it is 
curious. It is like arguing against a distinction between, say, modus ponens and ex 
consequentia reasoning on the grounds that those who employ these forms of argument 
show the same brain activity. For the validity of logical and conceptual distinctions, brain 
activity is neither here nor there. Perhaps, then, this is a particularly infelicitous 
manifestation of scientism: rather than rely on philosophical arguments, Harris prefers to 
jump to conclusions from apparently irrelevant scientific data. 
 
Back to Harris’s project. The second step identifies the right with the promotion of the 
well-being of conscious beings: “A concern for well-being (defined as deeply and as 
                                            
3 See, for instance, Kwame Anthony Appiah’s and H. Allen Orr’s reviews in the New York Times and the 
New York Review of Books respectively. 
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inclusively as possible) is the only intelligible basis for morality and values” (ibid.: 28). 
Well-being may be difficult to define exactly and our understanding of it is incomplete 
and evolving, but we do have a pretty firm grip on some of its key components, like 
physical and mental health, emotional flourishing, a supportive social environment, etc. 
The third step is the claim that human well-being is a completely natural affair. All of the 
facts about it are in principle open to scientific scrutiny. Questions about whether some 
action, policy, social arrangement contributes to the well-being of humans and other 
conscious creatures can be answered objectively by scientific means. Harris’s conclusion 
from this is that normative ethics is a scientific project: It consists in evaluating proposed 
actions, policies, institutions, practices, etc. in light of the amounts of well-being they 
promote, and choosing those courses of action that will increase general well-being. 
 
The scientism shines through clearly here. By identifying the right with the promotion of 
the well-being of conscious beings and claiming that well-being is to be understood in 
completely natural terms, Harris effectively sidesteps substantial debates in normative 
ethics between consequentialism, deontologism, and virtue ethics, opting for a version of 
consequentialism. In fairness, he does recognize that there are alternative accounts of 
rightness on offer, but surmises that they either ultimately boil down to a concern for 
well-being or else are nonsensical (ibid.: 32ff). 
 
The obvious worry is that neither the identification of rightness with the promotion of 
well-being, nor the naturalness of well-being are things that follow from science. In fact, 
it’s hard to see how they could. Science isn’t in in the business of making statements on 
moral rightness and wrongness and is also silent on the naturalness of well-being. 
 
Harris’s scientistic maneuver, then, boils down to this: He takes a firm philosophical 
stance without providing proper philosophical arguments for it and simply asserts that it 
follows logically from the results of science. In a telling note, he comments: 
 
I did not arrive at my position on the relationship between human values 
and the rest of human knowledge by reading the work of moral 
philosophers; I came to it by considering the logical implications of our 
making continued progress in the sciences of the mind (ibid.: 213). 
 
This is doubly curious. First, in its insistence that substantive moral views are among the 
‘logical implications’ of the sciences of the mind — we just noted the problem with this.4 
Second, the implicit admission that some sort of reasoning (or ‘considering’) is 
nonetheless necessary to draw out these implications is in tension with a wholesale 
dismissal of moral philosophy. For investigating what implications, if any, science has 
for morality is (part of) what moral philosophers have been working on for years. 
Properly doing this, then, would require serious engagement with moral philosophy. 
                                            
4 In addition, it is odd that only the sciences of the mind should be taken to have implications for morality. 
One would expect that at least biology, too, should count for something. 
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5. Scientism in Action: Frans de Waal 
 
Let’s consider next what the well-known primatologist, Frans de Waal, has to say about 
evolution and morality. In a series of books (e.g., De Waal 1996, 2013; Macedo & Ober 
2006), he has argued against what he dubs the ‘veneer theory of morality’: the view that 
moral behavior is but a fragile add-on to human nature, which is thoroughly amoral or 
immoral in and of itself. In opposition to the veneer theory, De Waal argues that human 
morality is a natural outgrowth of various kinds of social behavior in our evolutionary 
ancestors: 
 
The fact that the human moral sense goes so far back in evolutionary 
history that other species show signs of it plants morality firmly near the 
center of our much-maligned nature. It is neither a recent innovation nor a 
thin layer that covers a beastly and selfish makeup (De Waal 1996: 218). 
 
Based on a wealth of observations of the behavior of primates and other higher animals, 
he shows to what extent animals observe and respond to each other’s feelings, care about 
each other’s well-being, try to help each other, and enforce various schemes of 
reciprocity and fairness. What is perhaps even more surprising is that pro-social behavior 
extends not just to direct family and group members, but also to individuals outside the 
group and even across species-barriers. Behind all such behavior, De Waal proposes, are 
layers of neural and psychological mechanisms that enable and promote empathy. 
Cognitive evolution has built on top of this foundation to produce the more sophisticated 
forms of morality found in humans, which require ever greater expansions of the circle of 
empathy. 
 
What makes De Waal interesting from our current perspective is that his tone is far less 
strident than that of writers like Harris or Rosenberg. We don’t find the radical scientistic 
line about science inevitably answering all of life’s big questions. Nonetheless, as I want 
to show, there are more subtle scientistic undertones in De Waal’s work that deserve 
attention. 
 
As you will recall from section 1, De Waal thinks that the time has come for science to 
‘wrest morality from the hands of philosophers’. Apparently, then, he believes science 
can provide answers to the questions that moral philosophers ask. But when we look at 
the issues De Waal ends up addressing, it turns out that they’re rather different from the 
concerns of traditional moral philosophy. He details the origins of pro-social behavior in 
non-human and human animals: how it arose, its exact forms and scope, its possible 
evolutionary benefits, what neural and psychological mechanisms are responsible for it, 
etc. He also makes the plausible point that such pro-social tendencies are necessary for 
understanding human moral behavior and gestures at the idea that these tendencies partly 
explain the full spectrum of human morality. In his more recent work (De Waal 2013), he 
uses the same empirical findings to argue against ‘top-down morality’, which is the idea 
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that we derive specific moral prescripts from general moral principles, which are in turn 
derived from either pure reason or divine revelation.
5
 Instead, morality emerges from the 
bottom up, from deep in our evolutionary past. 
 
All of this is rightly fascinating and one can only marvel at the sophisticated social lives 
of animals. But my concern is whether anything De Waal says supports the idea that 
science can take over moral philosophy. I don’t think so. Here are two recent descriptions 
of the subject matter of ethics from representative introductory textbooks: 
 
At the heart of ethics are two questions: (1) What should I do?, and (2) 
What sort of person should I be? (Shafer-Landau 2012: xi) 
 
Normative ethics is the area of philosophy that, broadly speaking, is 
concerned with standards for right conduct and moral evaluation. 
Generally, such a theory will give an account of right action and try to 
give some idea of what makes it right. (Driver 2013: 2) 
 
Ethics, then, is concerned with a particular sort of normative evaluation of human 
behavior and human beings. De Waal does not address these issues directly in any way. 
Evolutionary and neuroscientific explanations of pro-social behavior do not tell us what 
we ought to do or what sort of persons we ought to be. And even if empirical material 
and evolutionary theorizing ought to inform ethics, they still aren’t the same thing. At the 
risk of belaboring the obvious: Showing that, say, humans, like apes, expect and enforce 
fairness doesn’t all by itself entail that doing so is morally right and it certainly does not 
explain why it is right. 
 
I should say that De Waal never commits the naturalistic fallacy in explicit form. 
Nonetheless, by advertising his work as having profound implications for our 
understanding of human morality, the suggestion looms large that we can easily get from 
how things are with pro-social behavior to how they morally ought to be. For instance, in 
a passage that attempts to relativize the importance of the is-ought distinction, he 
comments: “Human morality develops out of sensitivity to others and out of the 
realization that in order to reap the benefits of group life we need to compromise and be 
considerate of others” (De Waal 2013: 164). This conflates prudential oughts with moral 
ones. 
 
De Waal’s scientism, then, manifests itself as a bait-and-switch. He declares that science 
now has the means to answer traditional ethical questions, but instead changes the subject 
and elaborates on answers to a different set of questions. One never actually learns what 
                                            
5 De Waal wrongly believes that this is something most philosophers subscribe to: “According to most 
philosophers, we reason ourselves toward moral truths. Even if they don’t invoke God, they’re still 
proposing a top-down process in which we formulate the principles and then impose them on human 
conduct” (ibid.: 17). Neither virtue ethicists nor moral intuitionists and particularists would accept this idea. 
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he thinks about answers to the original questions or whether he perhaps thinks that those 
questions are irrelevant or unanswerable. 
 
6. Why It Matters 
 
In the previous sections, we have witnessed a number of scientistic lapses: adopting a 
philosophical position but forgoing the intellectual duty to argue for it, claiming that it 
just follows from science; ignoring relevant philosophical concepts and discussions and 
making up definitions of concepts or arguing against straw-men; and announcing that a 
perennial question will be answered but instead discussing work that is of limited 
relevance to this. If we combed through other popular science books, the list could surely 
be extended: wild extrapolations from the scientific data, undue reliance on scientific 
results at the cost of ignoring common sense, presenting a simplistic picture that glosses 
over scientific uncertainties and/or philosophical complexities, etc. There’s no point in 
doing that here, since the general pattern should be obvious by now. Several best-selling 
popular science writers implicitly rely on a scientistic epistemology, taking something 
like ES for granted. 
 
Why should we care about this? Is there more to it than a petty complaint by philosophers 
who feel threatened because scientists invade their turf? I believe the influence of 
scientism on popular science writing is very important, for at least two reasons. First, 
scientific literacy among the general public is a great good. If you think that knowledge is 
valuable in itself, then learning about issues such as our origins, our place in the universe, 
and our powers and limitations is valuable for its own sake. If you don’t think knowledge 
has intrinsic value, you can still agree that it has instrumental value. It contributes to 
people’s intellectual autonomy, informs their decision-making and acting, and it will 
shape their self-image and worldview. The well-functioning of liberal democracy 
depends on its citizenry being autonomous and knowledgeable to a certain extent. This is 
why popular science writing has a potentially valuable role to play: It helps people 
acquire knowledge. If popular science writing is heavily influenced by a scientistic 
epistemology, this basically means that people receive one-sided, misleading, or flat-out 
false information about the state of contemporary science and its broader implications. 
Obviously, this detracts from, rather than contributes to scientific literacy. 
 
Second, rampant scientism ultimately undermines the authority of science as our best 
source of information about those issues that do belong to its domain. This might happen 
in a number of ways. By prematurely presenting provisional scientific results and theories 
as if they have been established beyond doubt, scientistic treatments are  exposed to the 
risk of regularly having to back-pedal on earlier claims. This can give the false 
impression that scientific ideas are more in flux than they in fact are and that there is 
hardly any progress in science — that it’s all ‘just theories’. Also, scientistic 
presentations of science tend to entangle scientific results with naturalistic or 
physicalistic world-views in which humans are ‘nothing but’ the atoms that make them 
up, their brains, their unconscious impulses, etc. and in which the universe is devoid of 
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meaning and purpose. Even if such seemingly bleak world-views should turn out to be 
ultimately correct, it surely is too early now to proclaim that we know so for sure. Since 
many people rightly find these world-views unattractive, they will become mistrustful of 
the science from which it allegedly follows. This, too, undermines science. 
 
7. Popular Science Without Scientism? 
 
It is an important question, then, is how popular science writing can do better. I will offer 
some general advice here that would already make a substantial difference. Admittedly, 
these points may seem somewhat trivial. By way of apology, I can only say that, as we 
saw, popular science writers frequently ignore them. 
 
1. If you aren’t going to write about the big questions, don’t say you will. 
 
No matter the commercial benefits, it is intellectually objectionable to write as if you’re 
addressing perennial questions when you really aren’t. A corollary of this advice is to 
avoid writing as if scientific developments on a topic have now made philosophical 
reflection on that topic superfluous, when these scientific developments don’t really 
address the traditional philosophical questions. I take it that this hardly needs further 
explanation. 
 
Of course, this advice doesn’t amount to a ban on science writing that explores what 
scientific developments mean for free will, consciousness, morality, etc. Surely, scientific 
insights and discoveries having to do with these topics deserve to be brought under the 
public’s attention. But in doing so it is important to be clear on (a) whether scientific 
findings bear directly on the big questions as traditionally conceived and (b) if they don’t, 
how they might still be indirectly relevant to them. For instance, De Waal’s findings are 
more naturally thought of as belonging to the project of describing morality and human 
moral behavior (or perhaps even more accurately: social behavior), rather than that of 
traditional normative ethics. 
 
2. Distinguish between science and scientifically-inspired philosophy. 
 
Above, we noted the scientistic tendencies to jump to philosophical conclusions from 
scientific evidence and to run together scientific and philosophical issues. This advice is 
the natural remedy against those tendencies. When you are explicit about what the 
scientific evidence is and which theories are well-confirmed on the one hand and how 
these scientific results might bear on philosophical ideas on the other, there can be no 
mistakes about where science stops and philosophy begins. 
 
Related to this, authors should make it explicit how the argument from the scientific 
findings to philosophical claims is supposed to go. How are the relevant concepts defined 
in science and in philosophy? Is the argument a simple inductive generalization, an 
inference to the best explanation, or some combination of different arguments? What 
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additional premises are involved beyond the bare scientific data and inferences, if any? 
And what is the support for these premises? 
I’m aware that I’m making this sound easier than it will be in practice. The distinction 
between science and philosophy isn’t always sharp, and there is an ongoing debate about 
how much of philosophy could be or ought to be naturalized, i.e., replaced or at least 
significantly transformed by science. Even so, science writers could say where and how 
they go beyond the scientific data and why they think this is warranted. In this way, 
readers would at least be made sensitive to the potential problems that are involved in 
bringing science to bear on philosophical questions. For instance, science doesn’t answer 
conceptual questions directly. So when a choice is made to define a concept in one way 
rather than another, readers can be made aware that this isn’t itself a result of science. 
Similarly, science doesn’t settle normative questions about the right and the good all by 
itself. So when it is suggested that, say, pro-social behavior is a good thing or that it is 
right to expand our ‘circle of empathy’ to non-human animals, it should become clear 
that this isn’t entailed by science. 
 
3. Get your concepts straight 
 
When a work of popular science addresses a topic that philosophers have worked on for a 
long time already, it ought to be a minimal requirement for its author to adopt definitions 
of relevant concepts that are widely accepted in the philosophical community. And in 
those cases in which there is reason to reject those definitions, it ought to be explicated. 
 
Although the niceties of lots of definitions of concepts are contested in philosophy, there 
is also common ground. The point of this advice isn’t that every science writer ought to 
engage in extensive conceptual analysis first, but she should make sure that her 
definitions aren’t in flagrant contradiction with commonly made background assumptions 
and shared components of different definitions. The definition of free will, for example, 
remains a matter of considerable controversy, but it is clear that it ought not to be defined 
in such a manner that it requires the truth of mind-body dualism or such that a free choice 
requires the complete absence of external influences (cf. the examples given above in 
section 3). 
 
4. Mind that science has limits 
 
It cannot just be assumed that science can speak authoritatively about any topic 
whatsoever, especially where traditional philosophical questions are concerned. For some 
topics, it really is an open question how much, if anything, science can say about them 
(e.g., the compatibility of free will and determinism) and in some cases it even seems 
implausible that it can (why there is something rather than nothing). If science writers 
want to write about those topics, they ought to consider whether other sources of 
evidence might be available — common sense, a priori reasoning, thought experiments, 
intuitions — and how they relate to scientific evidence in the neighborhood that is 
available. This might mean rendering some questions unto philosophy. After all, 
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philosophers have been using these sources of evidence for a long time in trying to 
answer perennial questions. At this point, popular science writing would have to turn into 
popular philosophy writing. 
 
One might worry that following these pieces of advice would turn popular science books 
into an inaccessible philosophical treatises, which would presumably undermine their 
point. If popular science must be prefaced by a discussion of subtle philosophical 
distinctions and some finer points of epistemology, it wouldn’t make for enjoyable 
reading. In other words, the worry is that it is inherent in the genre of popular science to 
run roughshod over the technicalities filling the pages of professional philosophical and 
other academic prose. These aren’t the sort of things that lay audiences can — and must 
— be bothered with. 
 
I am not convinced by this worry. I don’t see why a philosophically sensitive treatment of 
some topic couldn’t at the same time be accessible and lively. But instead of trying to 
establish this point by way of abstract argument, I’d rather point to tangible evidence for 
it. Although his position might be relatively close to a scientistic perspective, Daniel 
Dennett has certainly been able to write about both science and philosophy in an 
extremely lively and accessible way (cf. his Consciousness Explained (1991) or Freedom 
Evolves (2003)). Furthermore, recent years have seen a number of other books which — 
at least in my opinion — do a wonderful job of presenting relevant scientific material 
while at the same time doing justice to philosophical insights and arguments. I’m 
thinking about Jim Holt’s Why Does the World Exist? (2012) on the issue of ultimate 
origins, Rebecca Goldstein’s Plato at the Googleplex (2014) on morality, and Alfred 
Mele’s Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will (2014) on free will. These books 
are clear testimony to the possibility — or rather the actuality — of popular science 
writing without scientism.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
I’ve shown that a scientistic epistemology pervades much contemporary popular science 
writing. We’ve looked in somewhat more detail at how this plays out in Sam Harris’s and 
Frans de Waal’s work on human morality, but similar points could be made about many 
other popular science books about origins, free will, rationality, and religion. This is a 
bad thing for a number of reasons. Not only does it undermine the potentially important 
role that science reporting has in modern society, it can also subvert the legitimate 
authority of science in those areas where we really ought to rely fully on scientific 
knowledge. Here lies a really important challenge, then, for science writers, scientists, 
and philosophers alike: to collaborate and produce works of popular science that are 
equally accessible, scientifically well-informed, and philosophically sensitive. 
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Appendix 
 
Scientistic sympathies are widespread throughout popular scientific literature. It is easy to 
find much more examples besides the quotes already given in the body of the text. 
 
Physics / cosmology 
• “Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as 
ornithology is to birds.” (usually attributed to Richard Feynman and often 
quoted) 
• “[While the question “Why is there something rather than 
nothing?”] is usually framed as a philosophical or religious question, it is 
first and foremost a question about the natural world, and so the 
appropriate place to try and resolve it, first and foremost, is with science.” 
(Krauss 2012: xiii) 
 
Consciousness 
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• “You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no 
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules.” (Crick 1994: 3) 
 
Morality 
• “Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility 
that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the 
hands of philosophers and biologicized.” (Wilson 1975: 562) 
• “We seem to be reaching a point at which science can wrest 
morality from the hands of philosophers. … The occasional disagreements 
within this budding field are far outweighed by the shared belief that 
evolution needs to be part of any satisfactory explanation of morality.” 
(De Waal 1996: 218) 
 
Free will 
• Based on well-known experiments in neuroscience, Sam Harris 
claims: “Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own 
making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of 
which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We 
do not have the freedom we think we have.” (Harris 2012: 5). 
• “Our current knowledge of neurobiology makes it clear that there’s 
no such thing as absolute freedom. … the only individuals who are still 
free to a degree (apart from their genetic limitations) are fetuses in the 
early stages of gestation.” (Swaab 2014: 327, 328) 
• The title of a popular Dutch book on neuroscience is simply: Free 
will does not exist: On who’s really in charge in the brain. (Lamme 2010)  
 
Religion 
• “Science has advanced sufficiently to be able to make a definitive 
statement on the existence or nonexistence of a God having the attributes 
that are traditionally associated with the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God” 
(Stenger 2007: 11) 
• “One of the important … implications of the new cognitive science 
of religion is the possibility that we’ve been going about studying the God 
question completely wrong for a very long time. Perhaps the question of 
God’s existence is one that is more for psychologists than for 
philosophers, physicists, or even theologians” (Bering 2011: 8) 
 
 
 
